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Abstract 
Currency gifts have proven to be a mixed blessing, as positive income shocks are often 
followed by financial problems and slow economic growth rates. Norway has twice been 
granted significant currency gifts: Firstly, through Britain’s huge demand for merchant fleet 
services in the nineteenth century, secondly, by the exploration of petroleum reserves during 
the last decades. Sweden has never gained currency gifts at the same scale. This paper offers 
an examination of the effects of currency gifts on these neighbouring small open economies 
by mapping relative wealth and seeking to examine patterns of convergence and divergence.  
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Introduction 
History has thought us that many countries rich on natural resources remain in poverty. This 
is for example reflected in third world countries rich on minerals. This may often be an effect 
of lack of institutions or processing industries in these countries, leaving them with exports of 
raw materials with high price elasticity of demand in markets with supply surpluses. Natural 
resources may also be utilised to generate cash, and thereby become sources of currency gifts. 
As for instance Sachs and Warner (2003) demonstrated, transforming natural resources into 
currency gifts does not necessarily imply success. In fact, it is often followed by poverty 
through Dutch disease or bad policy choices. This is reflected in the weakening economy of 
the oil exporting countries in the Middle East after the oil shocks in the 1970s and the high 
long-term petroleum prices thereafter. Such experiences may also have had an impact on 
growth accounting, assuming that natural resources do not play any significant, or in fact no 
role at all, in economic growth.  
 
Sweden and Norway have perhaps never been poor countries in relative terms, at least not 
compared to other European countries at the time. However, during the last centuries they 
have both developed rapidly, and showed higher growth rates than most other countries rich 
on natural resources. The political and institutional frameworks in Sweden and Norway seem 
to have been very similar during the last two centuries. However, we find periods of 
significant structural differences between the two countries. We will argue that these are 
connected to special currency gifts given to Norway due to its unique closeness to the sea and 
its continental shelf rich on natural resources. Norway gained its first significant currency gift 
during the great expansion of foreign trade in the nineteenth century, when Norwegian 
shipping tonnage was demanded widely. This situation was fuelled by the British 
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abandonment of the Navigation Act in 1850. The second huge currency gift to Norway came 
after oil was discovered on her continental shelf at the dawn of the 1970s.  
 
In the present paper we examine the economic consequences of these currency gifts. We ask 
if they can explain patterns of convergence and divergence between the two countries in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. If this is the case, we firstly find an economy able to 
handle currency gifts in a profitable manner. Secondly, we then suggest this contributes to 
that natural resources should not necessarily be out-ruled by the assumption of zero-
contribution to economic growth in growth accounting.  
 
The paper is organised as follows: Firstly, we give a theoretical background of our choice of 
approach. Secondly, we provide a description of the basic data used in this article. Thirdly, we 
offer an outline of economic growth in Norway and Sweden on the basis of the results from 
an ongoing project on harmonisation and calculation of historical national accounts for the 
Nordic countries. The figures are made comparable by using same standards and definitions 
of historical national accounting and by establishing PPP-figures. We then go to the analytical 
part of the paper, where we provide a presentation of the structural time series techniques we 
use. The final part is a qualitative interpretation on the basis of the periodisations of growth. 
In this part we present counter-factual calculations of GDP figures for Norway adjusted for 
the main sectors providing currency gifts. 
 
The two-country comparison approach 
In contemporary growth studies, cross-country growth regressions have been very popular, 
following for instance Summers and Heston’s (1991) seminal work. The empirical basis of 
comparative growth studies is often panel data sets comprising time series for several 
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countries. An advantage with the cross-country regression approach is the large amounts of 
data that facilitates econometric applications, when on the  other hand drawbacks concerning 
the gap between theory and the models have been pointed out (OECD 2000). An alternative, 
or rather complementary route, which is more popular within quantitative sociology than in 
economics, is the two-country comparison, on the basis of the principle of the most similar 
case. Within economic-history the two-country comparison approach is also familiar, 
comprising comparisons between e.g. the United Kingdom and France and the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The studies are, however, usually justified by differences in 
the countries’ economic history suggested by earlier scholarly work, often related to the 
“why-Britain-question”. The pure most similar case principle is rarer.     
 
When it comes to the 19th century European periphery very few two-country comparisons 
have been published in the international literature. We believe that studies of the most similar 
case principle could contribute to the understanding of e.g. catching-up growth. Norway and 
Sweden is from this perspective relevant for comparative growth studies due to their inherent 
structural similarities prior to the industrialisation process. Recent estimates of the Norwegian 
per capita income level for 1830 suggest income levels that are marginally higher than the 
Swedish; something places the countries neck by neck in per capita GDP at our starting point. 
The institutional structure is generally recognised as being similar as well. The two countries 
were between 1814 and 1905 joined in a royal union, and had to large extent comparable 
institutional structures in the fields of political system, economic policy, schooling, 
infrastructure, religion and public administration. Also both countries joined the gold standard 
through the Scandinavian Currency Union, which prevailed effectively for Denmark and 
Sweden between 1875 and 1914, and for Norway from 1877 onwards.  
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In this study we provide a comparison of long term-growth performance in Norway and 
Sweden. This has been possible by an ongoing project on harmonisation and construction of 
historical national accounts for the Nordic countries. Thus, we present estimates on new 
Norwegian GDP-figures from 1830 onwards (Grytten 2004) and new Swedish GDP series 
from 1800 onwards (Krantz 2001). We have estimated PPP-figures for the GDP per capita-
series of the two countries with 2003 as reference year, i.e. the series are given in 2003 US-
dollars. In order to decompose trends and be able to establish meaningful periodisations, 
labelled growth regimes, we apply Structural Time Series Decomposition. This allows us, in a 
statistical sense, to find more precise periodisation of such growth regimes, which in turn is 
important for qualitative analyses. 
 
Growth theory, convergence and divergence 
In the standard neoclassical growth model, also known as the Solow growth model, 
investments foremost in physical capital and exogenous technical change drive growth (Solow 
1956). Capital is assumed to show declining marginal rates of return. Together with the 
assumption that capital depreciates with a fixed percentage this leads to a decreasing rate of 
growth of net investments and the capital stock. Eventually, the capital stock per worker stops 
growing and the economy reaches a steady state, or dynamic equilibrium in which growth is 
determined by the exogenously given rate of technical change. 
The neoclassical growth model implies strong predictions for convergence between different 
countries. In the poorer countries, growth rates will be higher than in the rich countries in the 
short run. In the beginning, poor countries have the smallest capital stock per worker, which 
yields high rates of return on new investments and low depreciations. When the poor 
countries get richer, the growth rates will decline and in the end the growth rates in the 
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(former) poor countries and the rich countries will be the same. The neoclassical model, thus, 
predicts an unconditionally convergence in growth rates. Accordingly, a purely theoretical 
expectation is that the initially poorer of the two countries in our study at some subsequent 
point in time will experience catch-up growth until both economies grow at similar rates for a 
sustained period of time. 
We also recognise that the convergence in growth rates predicted by the neoclassical model 
does not necessarily imply convergence in income levels. Economies saving and investing a 
higher proportion of their income will eventually have higher per capita income than those 
saving and investing less. Thus, convergence in income levels is conditional. Another 
important conclusion drawn from the neoclassical model is that it is possible by economic-
political means to affect investment levels, which again affect growth in the short run, and, 
thus, income levels in the long run. Observations typically problematic to explain with in the 
neo-classical model concerns lack of convergence and patterns involving successive periods 
of sustained convergence, equal growth and divergence.  
In the new growth models introduced in the 1980s the simple neoclassical models were given 
more complex properties suited for explaining the absence of convergence (Lucas 1986). In 
these theories knowledge or human capital is introduced as a separate production factor, 
which gives fundamentally different predictions of factors generating growth in the long-run: 
neither has capital diminishing returns and nor is growth dependent on exogenous technical 
change. 
The recognition of non-diminishing returns for capital has important implications for the 
predictions on convergence. The new growth model by Ray (1998) predicts that if countries 
have the same original relation between physical and human capital, they will have equal 
growth rates. If the relation is not equal in the beginning, or there are differences in the 
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propensities to invest in the two kinds of capital, then the growth rates do not converge. In the 
growth models by Romer (1986, 1990) the predictions of divergence of growth rates and 
income levels are clear. Due to economies of scale and the presence of technological 
externalities proportional to the physical capital stock, rich countries will grow faster than 
poor and the gap in income levels will increase. Similarly Lucas (1988) emphasised human 
capital as a factor that could hinder convergence.  
Worth to notice is that new growth theory mainly seeks to explain lack of convergence. 
Again, patterns involving successive periods of various relative growth characteristics are 
difficult to explain within the theory. 
Another approach for explaining differences in growth performance is new institutional 
theory (NIT), largely following North (1990). Arguably, institutional theory targets the Solow 
model assumption, i.e. resources of the economy is efficiently utilised. According to NIT, 
differences in the institutions and institutional lock- in effects known as path-dependency, 
explain persistent differences in economic performance. Despite some fifteen years of 
theoretical development new institutional theory has not yet been able to provide a consistent 
theory, which can explain differences in growth with a high degree of precision. For instance 
it has been pointed out that new institutional theory better explains lack of change than 
change, and that the theory has difficulties in showing how institutions are to be empirically 
incorporated into growth models. Rather, similar growth rates are often assumed to reflect 
similar institutional structures and consequently different growth rates are assumed to reflect 
different institutional structures. Thus, NIT suffers from an identification problem, in the 
sense that growth theoretically is seen as the result of institutions, while differences in 
institutional structures often are indicated through differences in growth rates. This problem, 
we believe is especially problematic when income differences are small and institutional 
differences not evident.  
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The data 
A precondition for any subsequent investigation is to determine economic growth phases and 
differences in growth patterns between the two economies. To be able to do this, we have to 
examine the development of comparable GDP-figures for them. 
Historically, both Norway and Sweden were in the forefront of establishing national accounts. 
During the 1930s both countries prepared for nation-wide accounts, reporting the economic 
activity in their respective national economies. The exercise in fact brought to publication 
national income figures for Sweden covering the period 1861-1930, led by Erik Lindahl 
(1937). After the war new and refined historical national account series were constructed for 
Sweden in the 1950s by Olof Lindahl (1956) and in the 1960s by Östen Johansson (1967). As 
for Norway, the central bureau of Statistics took up the challenge from the 1930s and 
published the first national account figures, containing historical series, in the early 1950s 
(Statistics Norway 1953). Finally, in the 1960s complete sets of historical national accounts 
for Norway covering the years 1865-1960 were calculated by Juul Bjerke and published by 
Statistics Norway (1965, 1968). Both the Norwegian and the Swedish series were at the time 
some of the best historical GDP estimates published internationally. However, empirical 
sources and calculation methods were not always well documented. And they are now in a 
process of being revised. These works have given us updated time series on GDP for both 
Norway (Grytten 2004) and Sweden Krantz (2001). 
In addition, during the last decades both Sweden and Norway have been able to establish 
historical national account series further back in time. These are harmonised with current 
standards, both over time and cross-borders. For Sweden we now have annual GDP estimates 
stretching back to 1800 (Krantz 2001). As for Norway, recent estimates have been compiled 
back to 1830 (Grytten 2004). Both series are originally constructed from the product side and 
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they both reflect international standards (SNAs). However, admittedly, non of the series have 
been computed in detail, and revisions are necessary in respect of modernisation of the series 
covering the years from the 1860s to the first years after World War II. However, due to the 
work on harmonisation and standardisation of the Nordic historical national accounts, the 
Norwegian and the Swedish GDP-figures 1830 to present can be used as valid instruments for 
comparison of economic growth between the two countries. 
Ideally, we should have been able to establish several base years in our computations of PPP 
figures of per capita GDP and splice relevant periods into one series with one reference year. 
However, we do not have sufficient information to carry out such an exercise for the time 
being. To be able to establish comparable figures we have started with the UN calculations of 
GDP per capita in US 2003 dollars in PPPs. By deflating the nominal series by the 
corresponding price indices with 2003 as reference year, we obtain historical measures of per 
capita GDP in PPPs.  
 
Economic growth in Norway and Sweden 
The data described above give us the opportunity to present graphs on comparable measures 
of economic growth and relative income for Norway and Sweden. These will serve as the 
departure of our analysis. Comparable series of GDP per capita in PPPs for Norway and 
Sweden are, thus, reported in chart 1. 
 
CHART 1 ABOUT HERE 
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The chart reports significant and expanding rates of growth during the two centuries. In fact, 
with the exception of the last three decades for Sweden the graphs seem to report exponential 
trends of growth. Growth rates for different periods are reported in table 1, and show different 
periods of growth for the two economies during changing conditions. The first period is the 
years from 1830 and during the Great Victorian boom up to 1875. The second is the adoption 
of gold for the two countries along with the Great Depression of the nineteenth century and up 
to the split of the royal union in 1905. The third period consists of the growth years from the 
fourth period includes the post war years up to 1970, and finally our last period chosen 
stretches from 1970, when the Norwegian petroleum age started and till present. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The table clearly lines out periods of different growth rates between the two neighbouring 
economies. The relative differences between Norway and Sweden in PPP adjusted per capita 
GDP are illustrated in chart 2 below. A ten-year moving average line is also plotted into the 
chart, and gives a picture of the relative trends in income and growth between the two 
countries.  
INSERT CHART 2 HERE 
 
Model for defining patterns of structural growth 
Growth studies are depending on proper measurements of growth rates. When addressing 
questions relating to the determinants of changes in growth trends it is important to avoid 
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biased growth estimates due to business cycle related phenomena. Associated with this issue 
is the need to arrive at proper periodisations. Effects on long-term growth rates due to 
institutional factors and exogenous shocks are usually difficult to quantify. Scholars often 
need to settle with evidence based on the chronology of the changes in growth rates and the 
events that may explain changing growth rates. Thus, we need a method, which enable us to 
separate long-term trends from shorter fluctuations. This is necessary in order to analyse the 
impact of important changes in the long-term growth rates caused by the effect of currency 
gifts’ influence on economic structure.  
To examine the effect of currency gifts on the real economy we use a structural time series 
model. This is done in order to map underlying structural trends in GDP to structural changes 
in consequence of currency gifts. By doing this we easier find relevant trends in GDP for our 
purpose.   
 
Structural time series models (STRM) contain a stochastic trend and cyclical components 
(Koopman et al 2000, Harvey, 1989).1 One advantage of these models is that the components 
are possible to interpret. For instance, the stochastic trend may represent a slowly changing 
but comparatively stable economic structure, while the cyclical component may represent 
wave phenomena in the economy. Thus, it is compatible with often-used assumptions 
concerning economic historical processes. Structural time series models have therefore been 
used in several economic historical studies (see for instance Mills and Crafts 1996). The basic 
formulation of the model departures from the familiar: 
 
ICTY ++=        (1) 
                                                 
1 This part of the text is partly based on Lindmark (2002), Lindmark and Vikström (2003) and Vikström (2004). 
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where Y is the observed time series, T is the trend and C is the cyclical component. The 
irregular component I can be considered to be the residual or unexplained component of the 
time series. The general shape of a structural model with stochastic components is written as: 
 
ttttY eym ++=       (2) 
 
where Y is the observed time series at time t, and µ is the stochastic trend, ?  is the stochastic 
cyclical component, and e is a white noise element. This is the most commonly used 
decomposition, which also is used in this article. The possibility to give the components 
stochastic properties is especially attractive when the analysis covers such along time period 
as in this case. It would be erroneous to assume that the trend, for instance, would have a 
deterministic behaviour over extended periods of time. Moreover, the formulation of the trend 
that is used here also allows the estimation of not only the trend itself, but also the slope 
component or the rate of change of the trend. The slope component is an important tool for 
describing the changes in the trend and makes it easier to compare the behaviour of two or 
more trend components. Slope components are the growth of the slow-moving trend, which 
differs from annual growth rates of the original series, due to business cycles and other short-
term effects. Thus, it will be the slope component that will be the main component of interest 
when the pattern of growth is examined. One example on the usefulness of isolating slope 
components is Peláez (2004) who shows that U.S. long-term productivity slow-down started 
well before the 1973 OPEC crises, an event which accordingly was not responsible for the 
slow-down.  
 
The trend component is defined as:  
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tttt hbmm ++= -- 11       (3) 
ttt xbb += -1        (4) 
 
where ß is a stochastic component, more specifically the stochastic slope which describes the 
change of the trend. The elements ? and ? are independent stochastic elements or white-noise 
elements. Thus, the trend is determined by its value in the previous year, the change of the 
trend, and a random change. The change of the trend is determined by the change during the 
previous year, and a random element (known as a random-walk with drift).  
A stochastic cyclical component is also used in the models.  
The cyclical component is defined as a combination of sine/cosine components, where wt is a 
stochastic disturbance, similar to those discussed previously: 
 
( )
( ) ** 11*
*
11
cossin
sincos
tctctt
tctctt
wlylyry
wlylyry
++-=
++=
--
--    (5) 
 
Since the cyclical components are not used for analytical purposes in this study, we do not 
elaborate further in the technical aspects of the method.  
  
A reason why structural time series models are appropriate in economic historical studies is 
that it is often assumed that events during one year are determined by events during previous 
years and various unique factors. The thought of deterministic or mechanical causality is 
widely rejected in modern historical research. At the same time, it is often assumed that 
considerable structural stability is present. These properties are well captured in structural 
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time series models, through the random walk with drift procedure. The fit of the model is 
expressed in a measure called Rd2, which express (on a 0 to 1 scale) the improvement of the 
model in comparison to a random walk. Thus, the Rd2 measure cannot be interpreted as an 
equivalent to R2. 
Turning to the structural time-series models chart 3 reveals the slope component, in other 
words the growth of the trend of both economies. From the chart we can conclude that 
Norway experienced higher economic growth already in the 1830s. From the late 1830s there 
is, however, evidence for accelerating Swedish growth rates. In fact, these two graphs suggest 
that Norwegian GDP per capita was significantly higher then the Swedish in most of the 
1830s and 40s. This is in fact earlier than most writers on Scandinavian economic his tory 
seem to have believed. The remarkable success for Norway in the 1850s and 60s, is that she 
not only maintained the lead, but also strengthened it despite a significantly higher rate of 
manufacturing growth in Sweden. We notice that the development of the Swedish financial 
sector, including banks and insurance companies, also was strong in this period. Jonung and 
Hansson (1997) show that banking had a causal effect on growth in this period.  
 
CHART 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Anyway, Norwegian growth rates stayed at higher levels until the late 1860s. Then, due to a 
significant fall in Norwegian economic growth, Sweden narrowed the gap in the 1870s and 
80s. She maintained the highest growth rates of the two until World War I, and we map an 
evident and rapid catching up process between 1890 and 1905. Thus, we find conditional 
convergence in this period. Thereafter, Sweden had somewhat higher growth in the interwar 
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period, followed by a close race in the post World War II period, with Sweden marginally in 
front. However, from the 1960s economic growth has been higher in Norway, which means 
that she can record four succeeding decades with higher growth than her neighbour. During 
the last decade the differences have been significant. 
In short, according to our charts the two economies were on quite similar GDP levels at the 
beginning of the period in question, with Norway a horse head in front. Shortly, thereafter 
Norway managed to establish and a significant gap until the middle of the 1870s. This was 
maintained, but admittedly significantly reduced until 1890. Then, Sweden was able to close 
this gap under just few years until the turn of the century. From that period both countries 
experienced almost identical income levels and growth rates for roughly 70 years.  
Four evident questions can be raised on basis of the relative growth performance. In the first 
place, how can we explain the diverging process from the early 1830s to the middle of the 
1870s? Secondly, how can we explain the converging process from the middle of the 1870s to 
the first years of the twentieth century. Thirdly, why did the two economies have such similar 
growth rates from the early 1900s to the 1970s? Finally, why did the two economies diverge 
again from around 1980 to the present days?  
 
Exploring institutional explanations  
If we look at fundamental institutional differences at the level typically found in cross-country 
studies such as in terms of private property rights, absence of totalitarism and economic 
freedom, it is difficult to trace any institutional differences between the two countries in the 
first phase of divergence up to the 1860s or 70s. The two countries were united into a loose 
union with a common king. They both monitored their own independent economic policy and 
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monetary system, but the systems were very similar. However, there were some minor 
differences. Norway was slightly more liberal than Sweden, when Sweden had a larger public 
sector, due to a larger military force and a more costly state church. However, the public 
sector was still very limited in the two economies, representing only a fraction of their total 
GDP (Bjørsvik 2004). Norway also ran a longer deflationary monetary policy in the 1830s in 
order to reach at par silver value of the speciedaler. Apart from this, which is a case of 
difference in economic policy and not in institutions per se, the institutions and the framework 
for the economy seemed very similar in the two countries, and we find it very difficult to 
understand that institutions can explain the differences in growth rates between the two 
countries in this first phase up to the 1870s.  
Turning to the Swedish catch-up growth phase from the 1870s it is evident that the gap was 
closed by a decline in Norwegian growth rates in combination with a burst of Swedish take-
off growth. According to chart 3 the Norwegian slowdown in growth rates started in 1863, 
more than a decade earlier than most writers on Norwegian economic history seem to have 
believed (Hodne 1975, Bergh 1981). It lasted until 1882, despite some downturns in the 
Norwegian GDP towards the end of the decade. Sweden also faced slowdown within this 
period. However it started six years later and caused a lower decline in growth rates. In 
Sweden they dropped from 1.6 to 1.3 per cent. As for Norway, they dropped from 1.6 to 0.8 
per cent. Accordingly, this part of the story begs the question why the slow-down lasted 
longer in Norway and why it was more severe than in Sweden. Could Norway have strayed 
from a common growth path through institutional shortcomings? 
It is hard to find evidence for this view. Both countries adopted the international gold standard 
and they even set up the Scandinavian Monetary Union together with Denmark in the 1870s. 
There were large differences neither in foreign trade policies nor in domestic economic 
policies. They were both two small open economies in a liberal international order. When 
 17 
liberalism was somewhat reversed towards the last part of the century, the two countries 
followed the same path, both in direction and strength. The dismissal of the union in 1905 had 
virtually no other impact than a new royal family in Norway and independent Norwegian 
diplomacy. 
In the next period up to the 1960s or 70s, depending on when the differences were easily seen 
at the time, the two countries showed close growth rates and income levels. However, with a 
minor advantage to Sweden.  
Given an institutional theoretical approach, the similarity in growth performance implies 
institutional resemblance. An overview into the formation of the welfare state and other 
aspects of regulation, suggests that this may be the case. It is easy to argue that similar growth 
rates in two neighbouring economies with similar income levels, is quite reasonable. 
However, Sweden still stayed in front for the entire period, and even reported marginally 
higher growth rates. A plausible explanation for Sweden’s better performance during the 
interwar period is the long and persistent deflationary monetary policy aimed at reaching the 
par gold value of the Norwegain krone in the 1920s (Hanisch 1999). Sweden also pursued a 
deflationary policy, but the way to go was significantly shorter both in time and level. We 
also recognise that Sweden was pioneering price level targeting in the 1930s, which may have 
had a positive effect on investments (Berg and Jonung 1999). Thereafter, the centralised 
planning in both Sweden and Norway after World War II may have set the market forces out 
of order to obtain full convergence between the two countries. However, the differences are 
small in this period why we dare to generalise the period as a period of more or less the same 
growth rates. 
However, if we assume that institutional similarity explains the similar growth rates from the 
early 1900s to the 1960s, and if we stick to the institutional explanation also for the post 1970 
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divergence period, Sweden somehow must have strayed away from a common Scandinavian 
model thereafter. This view has in particular been used to explain Sweden’s performance 
since the 1970s, characterised by reports suggesting that Swedish per capita income had been 
lagging behind the OECD average since the 1970s (Ståhl and Wickman, 1993, Lindbeck, 
2005). One possibility is that Sweden overstretched its ambitions with the welfare state. This 
view gains some plausibility by Midtbø (1999) who identifies public spending and growth as 
reciprocally in small economies. Lindert (2004) is on the contrary highly sceptical to the 
overstretched welfare state hypothesis. Institutional impact on growth is, however, not only 
about levels of public expenditure. Olson (1971, 1983) formulates a theory concerning 
relationships between institutions and growth rates. Here, institutions are seen as collective 
groups promoting common interest. On the one side institutions may promote growth. On the  
other side, when they may cause major disruptions without carrying their own costs, they may 
also hamper economic growth.  
The government’s attempt to “rescue” the Swedish ship building industry between 1977 and 
1985 could be seen in this perspective, and it has indeed frequently been used as a symbol for 
misguided industry politics in the period. It has therefore been suggested that this exponent of 
the “democratic corporate model” contributed to slower growth (Mokyr, 2003, vol 4, p 105).  
Considering tha t the state-owned Svenska Varv AB, that took over bankrupted private 
wharves, reduced the number of workers from roughly 25 000 to 2 500 persons while 
subsidies amounted to 34 billion SEK over a ten-year period, on average less than 0.5 % of 
annual GDP, makes it less convincing that this type of industrial politics contributed to 
significantly lower growth rates. In addition the Norwegian government followed the same 
kind of subsidy policies towards shipyards (Espeli 1992). Other examples of Swedish 
industrial policy during the 1970s, most prominently the rescue of LKAB and northern 
Swedish iron ore industry has proved to be very successful. 
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We also notice that the view that Sweden lagged behind other countries has been questioned. 
Korpi (1996, 2004, 2005) argued that the lagging-behind was a statistical effect due to the 
comparison with the OECD, including countries with comparatively low income levels in the 
1970s, which accordingly experienced catch-up growth during the period. Instead he made a 
comparison with a group of countries of comparable income levels in 1970, which suggested 
similar growth patterns. Korpi’s conclusion was simply that the lagging-behind problem did 
not exist. Thus, according to him there were no unique macroeconomic reasons for 
institutional reforms in Sweden. If he is right, then the present income-gap to Norway must 
due to extraordinary Norwegian economic performance. 
It is often claimed that Norwegian regulatory reforms and the shaping of the welfare state was 
inspired by Swedish examples during the 1950s and 1960s, when Norway was a major 
capitalist pioneer in centralised economic planning (Søilen 1998). Again, reasoning from an 
institutional perspective, keeping in mind the similar growth performance and income levels 
in the early 1960s, it then appears as a mystery why sclerosis occurred in Sweden, but not in 
Norway. It is equally clear that the sclerosis explanation must be flawed since more of the 
assumed problem, i.e. centralised economic planning, cannot have produced different effects 
on growth in Sweden and Norway. Already this short overview throws some doubt on a 
general institutional explanation. In an attempt to refine Olson’s approach Booth et al (1997) 
are arguing that intuitional structures are formed in specific economic and political 
environments, “the historical context”. These make straightforward theoretical analyses of 
their evolution difficult. Furthermore, they emphasises that long-run productivity outcomes 
cannot be predicted from given institutional structures. In practice they warn against 
exaggerated expectations on institutions as holding the key to understanding economic 
performance with any precision. 
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Although we argue that the general institutional characteristics are similar in the two 
countries, there are some differences. Interestingly enough, these differences generally do not 
favour Norway, in the sense that they are easily compatible with theoretical predictions of 
efficient markets. One such difference is the very high degree of state ownership in 
Norwegian industry. In the 1990s it peaked with 40 per cent, measured as the stock value at 
the Oslo exchange owned by the state, in Norway against less than ten per cent in Sweden 
(Hanisch, Søilen and Ecklund 1999). This was to an extent due to state ownership of the 
dominating Norwegian oil companies Statoil and Norsk Hydro and to temporary state control 
over the Norwegian bank system after the huge financial crises 1988-1993. However, despite 
privatisation during the last years, Norway still runs and traditionally ran an economy with 
very high degree of state ownership, which we believe many economists would consider not 
being beneficial to growth. It is possible to make the list longer. Sweden abolished most of its 
agricultural protection in the 1980s, while Norwegian food industry and agriculture is still 
protected by high tariffs. Sweden de-monopolised railways in the 1980s, while the state 
monopoly remains in Norway. Wages –fully or partly- are often individually negotiated in 
Sweden, while this is seldom the case in Norway.  
Thus, it is difficult to see how the differences in institutional factors that we have discussed 
here could explain why Norwegian economic growth has been so much higher as compared to 
Sweden. We believe that the key is rather the industries in which Norwegian state ownership 
is strong, i.e. the petroleum sector. This, we will argue, is the best candidate to explain the 
huge divergence during the last decades. This explanation will not come as a surprise. 
However, one should bear in mind that during the Norwegian petroleum adventure from the 
1970s till present most oil exporting countries have had severe problems in their economy, 
many with stagnant GDP developments. In fact, most Arab oil producing countries have 
experienced contraction in their per capita GDP since the significant increase in oil prices in 
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the 1970s. In this picture, significant Norwegian growth due to exploitation of oil and gas 
reserves makes up an exception from a common pattern during the last decades. 
 
Currency gifts 
Since divergence and convergence between the to economies can hardly been explained by 
institutional differences, we would rather suggest that currency gifts seem to have played a 
crucial role.  
In 1830 Norway initially had a somewhat higher GDP per capita than Sweden due to 
utilisation of its rich fish resources. Thereafter, Norway gained foreign currencies and 
economic growth through the rapid increase in world trade, and thereby an outward shift in 
demand for Norwegian shipping tonnage. This growth reached its peak after the British 
abandonment of the Navigation Act in 1850. Norwegian export volume showed an annual 
growth rate of 3.7 per cent 1830-1865, when the corresponding growth rate for GDP was 2.4 
per cent (Brautaset 2002). Not being an equal maritime power to Norway made Swedish 
growth rates lag behind the Norwegian despite its earlier industrialisation and supreme 
financial strength.   
Then, from the 1870s onwards the merchant fleet of Norway saw a significant relative decline 
due to lack of capital in order to manage a rapid transformation from sail to steam (Fischer 
and Nordvik 1986).  Thereafter, Sweden recorded higher growth rates than Norway since the 
1860/1870s. In this period Sweden were simply favoured by favourable natural resources in 
terms of forests, iron and rivers for power and timber floatation which formed a basis for 
rapid industrialisation. The Norwegian relative decline in the merchant fleet could not be 
compensated for by the two other main export industries. The fish stocks on the Norwegian 
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continental shelf showed signs on over fishing in some areas. Thus, the growth in fisheries 
slowed down. In addition Norwegian timber resources were exhausted in the late nineteenth 
century. Since Norwegian timber did not have the same quality as in Sweden, why Norway 
could not a Swedish type of industrial development based on timber (Hodne and Grytten 
2000). Instead, Norwegian entrepreneurs initially played an important role in the diffusion of 
sawmill industry in Sweden (Björklund et al 1991).  
During the 1880s both countries again experienced increasing growth rates, but with the 
difference that the Swedish growth record was better up to 1905. After a Swedish slow-down 
until approximately 1915 more or less common growth-rates were reached. From this period, 
similar growth rates prevailed until the 1960s. During these years neither Norway nor Sweden 
received any significant currency gifts through exploitation of latent resources. 
Then, from the 1970s the oil and gas adventure started for Norway. Parliament soon gained 
control over the resources discovered in December 1969 by establishing the 100 per cent state 
owned company Statoil. Through corporation with foreign oil companies Statoil soon learned 
the business and took over responsibilities from their partners. In this way the state gained 
almost entirely control over the Norwegian oil and gas production, until the system was 
liberalised in the 1990s. Along with the start of the Norwegian oil industry, prices stepped up 
dramatically in the 1970s. The value of the Norwegian oil and gas production increased form 
zero per cent of GDP in 1971 to 14 per cent in 1980, and reached a peak of 18.5 per cent in 
1984. Towards the end of the 1990s it normally fluctuated around 15 per cent, depending on 
the very volatile petroleum prices. Due to high prices in the first years of the 21st century the 
share has come closer to 20 per cent. At present, petroleum accounts for about 50 per cent of 
Norwegian exports and 20 per cent of gross investments (Hodne and Grytten 2002). 
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Evidence for positive effects from North Sea oil are for instance provided by Mork and Olsen 
(1994) who investigate correlations between oil-price movements and GDP fluctuations for 
the United States, Canada, Japan, Germany (West), France, the United Kingdom, and 
Norway. From our perspective the relevant results are that the Norwegian economy benefits 
significantly from oil price increases, while the effect was the opposite in oil importing 
economies. Simply put: what is good for Norway is bad for Sweden.   
Our assumption that Norway had a net benefit from North Sea oil is also supported by 
Bjørnland (1998) who concludes that while Dutch disease effects could be seen in the UK, the 
Norwegian manufacturing industry benefited from oil discoveries and oil price increases in 
the period 1973-1991. This, she argues, may be explained by state subsidies during the 
transitional period of North Sea oil, which kept unemployment at low levels. Accordingly, the 
management of oil revenues seems to be cruc ial for whether a country is struck by natural 
resource curse, or as in the Norwegian case, actually benefits from large oil discoveries. Eifert 
et al (2001) points out that oil revenue management concerns the achievement of economic 
stability in the face of fluctuating oil revenues and how to ensure high quality spending, 
whether in the form of large investment projects, public consumption, or subsidies.  
While Davis et al (2001) argues that oil funds have been problematic in many countries, they 
point out that Norway is an exception since sound and transparent fiscal and macroeconomic 
policies were implemented before setting up the State Petroleum Fund. Their argument is very 
much the same as Eifert et al (2001) who states that successful oil revenue management is 
depending on the general political stability and institutional accountability of a country, while 
observing that Norway “has been successful in using its highly consensus-oriented and 
parliamentary institutions, as well as the involvement of interest groups representing business 
and labour, to reconcile competing claims for oil revenues with long-term objectives and 
stabilization goals” which contrast to most other oil-exporting countries.  
 24 
However, as we previously argued concerning the institutional similarities between Norway 
and Sweden, the general characterisation of the political system that created the successful oil 
revenue management, would hold true also for Sweden. The imperative diverging factor 
between Swedish and Norwegian growth performance during the past decades is therefore not 
primarily institutional differences, but North Sea oil.  
 
Adjusting GDP for currency gift sectors  
Due to reasons of economic planning and accounting, Statistics Norway has calculated GDP 
figures excluding the offshore oil industry. Needless to say this adjusted GDP is affected by 
the oil industry incomes, and the arithmetic approach of deducting the oil industry incomes of 
course ignores the both positive and negative dynamic effects on the inland economy. A 
positive effect could be absence of public borrowing, more funds available for investments, 
and a negative effect appreciation of the currency resulting in the “dutch disease syndrome”. 
Despite these shortcomings, the adjusted GDP provides a rough counterfactual of what the 
Norwegian economic performance would have been without oil. 
Our challenge is to do the same with the other sector providing Norway a huge currency gift, 
i.e. the 19th century merchant fleet. This is of course also a counter factual analys is. By 
subtracting value added to the economy from the merchant fleet from GDP we arrive at GDP 
figures less the merchant fleet contribution. However, this is not a relevant measure, since the 
capital used on ships would have been invested elsewhere. It is reasonable to believe that this 
capital then would have given about the same level of return as the average. Thus, we suggest 
that the Norwegian GDP growth rates would have been the same as in the non-merchant fleet 
sectors. We find 1845, which also serves as a benchmark year in the historical national 
accounts, as a representative year for the merchant fleet’s share of GDP before the giant boom 
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in shipping services. Thus we calculate the counter- factual merchant fleet adjusted GDP 
figures with 1845 as base year. This implies that GDP for 1845 is equal for the two GDP 
measures, when the extended growth rates, and thus levels of GDP are different.  
Chart 4 shows the development of GDP per capita and the corresponding adjusted figures for 
Norway along with the Swedish figures. As the graphs reveal Norwegian GDP adjusted for 
the currency gift sectors is more similar to the Swedish GDP. The figures reveal that in the 
nineteenth century Norway maintained the gap down to Sweden due to the currency gift 
earned by the merchant fleet.  
 
CHART 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
During the relative decline of this sector Norway lost ground and was caught up by the dawn 
of the twentieth century. Then, from the late 1970s the currency gift from the Norwegian 
petroleum sector made a new phase of divergence in favour of Norway. 
Clearly, Norway have profited from its currency gifts during their duration. However, when 
the income from the merchant fleet fell from the 1870s Norway’s growth fell significantly. 
Nothing had been planned to accumulate capital from this currency gift. This is in contrast to 
the present situation, where Norway successfully has accumulated capital in its Petroleum 
Fond. Charts 5 and 6 reveal the corresponding estimated trends. Both during the 19th and 20th 
centuries it is clear that the currency gifts produced differences in long-term growth.   
 
INSERT CHART 5 HERE 
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INSERT CHART 6 HERE 
 
According to this chart the growth rates, peaks and turns were quite similar in the two 
economies when the huge currency gift sectors are omitted. The Norwegian periods of 
positive divergence in the real GDP slope component series happened to be in times of huge 
currency gifts. Thus, we can conclude with two examples when currency gifts have given 
sustainable economic growth for several decades. Chart 7 clearly shows how the slope 
components are influenced by the sectors providing huge currency gifts into the Norwegian 
economy. In particular, for the last decades of the twentieth century our counter factual slope 
component analysis suggests Norwegian and Swedish GDP would have followed the same 
pattern if the income from the petroleum sector had been omitted. 
 
INSER CHART 7 HERE 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the present paper we have investigated phases of convergence and divergence between two 
small open ne ighbouring economies, i.e. Norway and Sweden, in the nineteenth and twentieth 
century. By estimating comparable per capita GDP figures in PPPs we have concluded on 
relative income and growth rates between the two countries. By using structural time series 
analysis we have mapped phases of convergence and divergence during periods of structural 
variance between the two countries, We conclude that Sweden lagged increasingly behind 
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Norway from the 1830s towards the 1870s and from around 1980 to present. When Sweden 
showed a remarkable catching-up growth 1870-1905. As for the period 1905-1970, the two 
economies very much stayed at the same per capita income level and growth rates with a 
minor advantage Sweden. 
Given the similar institutional structures in the two economies, we do not find institutions as a 
plausible explanation for the differences, perhaps with an exception for the minor differences 
in the first 25 post World War II years, when a similar, but very rigid institutional framework 
may have hindered the market forces to converge the economies.  
The two significant divergence phases can better be explained by the efficient utilisation of 
currency gifts provided to Norway. This is clearly illustrated in our counter-factual use of 
structural time series analysis on GDP for Norway exclusive the merchant marine 1830-1910 
and the offshore petroleum industry from the 1970s onwards. The trend analysis also shows 
that currency gifts have created long periods of diverging growth, and not only short boom 
phases. This analysis suggests that Norway would not have done significantly better than 
Sweden without these sectors. Our analysis points at similar, however, more preliminary, 
suggestion: natural resources should not necessarily be assumed as zero in growth accounting.  
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Chart 1. GDP per capita 1830-2003 for Norway and Sweden in PPPs (2003 US dollars). 
100
1000
10000
100000
1
8
3
0
1
8
4
0
1
8
5
0
1
8
6
0
1
8
7
0
1
8
8
0
1
8
9
0
1
9
0
0
1
9
1
0
1
9
2
0
1
9
3
0
1
9
4
0
1
9
5
0
1
9
6
0
1
9
7
0
1
9
8
0
1
9
9
0
2
0
0
0
Norway
Sweden
 
Sources: Krantz (2001) and Grytten (2004). 
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Table 1. Growth rates in GDP per capita for Norway and Sweden 1830-2003. 
          
Period Norway Sweden 
  y=(yT/yt)
-(T-t) y=b0e
b
1
t
 y=(yT/yt)
-(T-t) y=b0e
b
1
t
 
         
1830-1875 1.38% 1.37% 1.15% 1.12% 
1875-1905 0.67% 0.94% 1.55% 1.66% 
1905-1970 2.60% 2.48% 2.75% 2.62% 
1970-2003 2.91% 2.84% 1.51% 1.32% 
         
1830-2003 2.00% 2.01% 1.89% 2.07% 
          
 Sources: Krantz (2001) and Grytten (2004). 
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Chart 2. GDP per capita in PPPs (2003 US dollars) for Norway relative to Sweden 
(NOR:SWE). 
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Sources: Krantz (2001) and Grytten (2004). 
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Chart 3. Slope component of Swedish (LSverige) and Norwegian (LNorge) log GDP per 
capita 1830-2003 in 2003 US PPP- dollars 
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Sources: Krantz (2001) and Grytten (2004). 
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Chart 4.  GDP per capita in Norway, Sweden and Norway adjusted for the shipping industry 
(19th century) and off-shore industry (20th and 21st  centuries) (ADJNOR) 1830-1910. 2003 
US PPP dollars. Log scale. 
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Sources: Krantz (2001) and Grytten (2004). 
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Chart 5. Trend component of Swedish (LN_SWE) and Norwegian (LN_NOR) log GDP per 
capita and Norwegian log GDP per capita excluding the shipping industry (lnFLNOR). 1830-
1910 in 2003 US PPP dollars. 
6,5
7
7,5
8
8,5
9
9,5
18
30
18
35
18
40
18
45
18
50
18
55
18
60
18
65
18
70
18
75
18
80
18
85
18
90
18
95
19
00
19
05
19
10
LSWE
LNOR
LFLNOR
 
 
Sources: Krantz (2001) and Grytten (2004). 
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Chart 6. Trend component of Swedish (LSWE) and Norwegian (LNOR) log GDP per capita 
and Norwegian log GDP per capita excluding the oil industry (ADJNOR). 1970-2003 in 2003 
US PPP dollars. 
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Sources: Krantz (2001) and Grytten (2004), Statistics Norway (2005). 
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Chart 7. Slope component of Swedish and Norwegian log GDP per capita and Norwegian 
GDP excluding shipping and off-shore industry, 1830-2003 in 2003 US dollars. 
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